Browse code

Adición de protoescrito

NikaZhenya authored on 24/08/2018 10:56:47
Showing 15 changed files
1 1
new file mode 100644
... ...
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
0
+@Article{hughes1988a,
1
+  author    = {Hughes, Justin},
2
+  title     = {The Philosophy of Intellectual Property},
3
+  journal   = {Georgetown Law Journal},
4
+  year      = {1988},
5
+  groups    = {Primaria},
6
+  keywords  = {Primaria},
7
+  leido     = {true},
8
+  timestamp = {2017-02-19},
9
+  url       = {http://www.justinhughes.net/docs/a-ip01.pdf},
10
+}
11
+
12
+@Inbook{moore2008a,
13
+  chapter   = {Personality-Based, Rule-Utilitarian, and Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property},
14
+  pages     = {105--130},
15
+  title     = {The Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics},
16
+  publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons, Inc.},
17
+  year      = {2008},
18
+  author    = {Moore, Adam D.},
19
+  editor    = {Himma, Kenneth Einar},
20
+  groups    = {Primaria},
21
+  keywords  = {Primaria},
22
+  leido     = {true},
23
+  timestamp = {2017-02-19},
24
+  url       = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1980852},
25
+}
26
+
27
+@Article{moore2014a,
28
+  author    = {Moore, Adam and Himma, Ken},
29
+  title     = {Intellectual Property},
30
+  journal   = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
31
+  year      = {2014},
32
+  publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
33
+  edition   = {Winter 2014},
34
+  editor    = {Edward N. Zalta},
35
+  groups    = {Primaria},
36
+  keywords  = {Primaria},
37
+  leido     = {true},
38
+  timestamp = {2017-02-19},
39
+  url       = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/intellectual-property/},
40
+}
41
+
42
+@Misc{schroeder2004a,
43
+  author    = {Schroeder, Jeanne},
44
+  title     = {Unnatural Rights: Hegel And Intellectual Propery},
45
+  year      = {2004},
46
+  groups    = {Primaria},
47
+  keywords  = {Primaria},
48
+  leido     = {false},
49
+  timestamp = {2017-02-19},
50
+  url       = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=518182},
51
+}
52
+
53
+@Inbook{shiffrin2007a,
54
+  chapter   = {Intellectual Property},
55
+  pages     = {653--668},
56
+  title     = {A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy},
57
+  publisher = {Blackwell},
58
+  year      = {2007},
59
+  author    = {Shiffrin, Seana Valentine},
60
+  groups    = {Primaria},
61
+  keywords  = {Primaria},
62
+  leido     = {true},
63
+  url       = {https://www.academia.edu/3428807/Intellectual_Property},
64
+}
65
+
66
+@Article{stengel2004a,
67
+  author    = {Daniel Stengel},
68
+  title     = {Intellectual Property in Philosophy},
69
+  journal   = {ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy},
70
+  year      = {2004},
71
+  publisher = {Franz Steiner Verlag},
72
+  volume    = {90},
73
+  number    = {1},
74
+  pages     = {20--50},
75
+  issn      = {0001-2343},
76
+  groups    = {Primaria},
77
+  keywords  = {Primaria},
78
+  leido     = {true},
79
+  notas     = {The article deals with the concept of intellectual property and its basis in different philosophical theories. First, the author gives a short historical overview of the development of intellectual property, locating its roots already in pre-historical society. It is followed by an examination of today's features of intellectual property, in contrast to 'regular' property. In the second part, the article analyses the theories of Locke, Kant, Hegel, Servan and Foucault to explain intellectual property, followed by a discussion which of their theories' features are reflected by today's intellectual property law.},
80
+  url       = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/23681627},
81
+}
82
+
83
+@TechReport{cerlalc2015a,
84
+  author      = {VV.~AA.},
85
+  title       = {América Latina: la balanza comercial en propiedad intelectual},
86
+  institution = {CERLALC},
87
+  year        = {2015},
88
+  type        = {techreport},
89
+  file        = {:recursos/cerlalc2015a.pdf:PDF},
90
+  groups      = {Secundaria},
91
+  keywords    = {Secundaria},
92
+  url         = {https://github.com/NikaZhenya/taller-flacso/blob/master/6-sabado/recursos/cerlalc.pdf},
93
+}
94
+
95
+@Inbook{hegel2003a,
96
+  chapter   = {La cosa misma y la individualidad},
97
+  pages     = {237--241},
98
+  title     = {Fenomenología del Espíritu},
99
+  publisher = {Fondo de Cultura Económica},
100
+  year      = {2003},
101
+  author    = {Hegel, G. W. F.},
102
+}
103
+
104
+@Inbook{hegel1971a,
105
+  chapter   = {Determinación próxima del principio de la historia universal},
106
+  pages     = {44--79},
107
+  title     = {Lecciones de Filosofía de la Historia},
108
+  publisher = {Ediciones Zeus},
109
+  year      = {1971},
110
+  author    = {Hegel, G. W. F.},
111
+}
112
+
113
+@Misc{bm2018a,
114
+  author = {Banco~Mundial},
115
+  title  = {Charges for the use of intellectual property, receipts},
116
+  year   = {2018},
117
+  url    = {https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.GSR.ROYL.CD?end=2016&locations=1W-ZJ-US-EU-CN&start=1990&year_high_desc=false},
118
+}
119
+
120
+@Misc{bm2018b,
121
+  author = {Banco~Mundial},
122
+  title  = {Charges for the use of intellectual property, payments},
123
+  year   = {2018},
124
+  url    = {https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.GSR.ROYL.CD?end=2016&locations=1W-ZJ-US-EU-CN&start=1990&year_high_desc=false},
125
+}
126
+
127
+@Misc{bm2018c,
128
+  author = {Banco~Mundial},
129
+  title  = {GDP},
130
+  year   = {2018},
131
+  url    = {https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2016&locations=1W-ZJ-US-EU-CN&start=1990&year_high_desc=false},
132
+}
133
+
134
+@Inbook{fisher2016a,
135
+  chapter   = {Teorías de la propiedad intelectual},
136
+  title     = {¿Propiedad intelectual? Una recopilación de ensayos críticos},
137
+  publisher = {Perro Triste},
138
+  year      = {2016},
139
+  author    = {Fisher, William},
140
+  isbn      = {9786079718404},
141
+  groups    = {Primaria},
142
+  keywords  = {Primaria},
143
+  leido     = {true},
144
+  timestamp = {2017-02-19},
145
+  url       = {https://github.com/ColectivoPerroTriste/Ebooks/blob/master/Colecci%C3%B3n%20Delta/Libros/Propiedad%20intelectual/PropiedadIntelectual.epub},
146
+}
147
+
148
+@Book{drahos1996a,
149
+  title     = {A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Applied Legal Philosophy)},
150
+  publisher = {Dartmouth Pub Co},
151
+  year      = {1996},
152
+  author    = {Peter Drahos},
153
+  isbn      = {978-1-85-521240-4},
154
+  file      = {:recursos/drahos1996a.pdf:PDF},
155
+  groups    = {Primaria},
156
+  keywords  = {Primaria},
157
+  leido     = {false},
158
+  timestamp = {2017-02-19},
159
+  url       = {http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=A9102DE4142FED0E1E3ACD70BE069EBB},
160
+}
161
+
162
+@Inbook{locke2006a,
163
+  chapter   = {De la propiedad},
164
+  pages     = {32--55},
165
+  title     = {Segundo Tratado sobre el Gobierno Civil},
166
+  publisher = {Tecnos},
167
+  year      = {2006},
168
+  author    = {Locke, John},
169
+  editor    = {Mellizo, Carlos},
170
+  isbn      = {9788430944354},
171
+  timestamp = {2017-02-19},
172
+  url       = {https://dairoorozco.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/locke-segundo-tratado-sobre-el-gobierno-civil.pdf},
173
+}
174
+
175
+@TechReport{ompi2015a,
176
+  author      = {VV.~AA.},
177
+  title       = {Informe Mundial sobre la Propiedad Intelectual en 2015},
178
+  institution = {OMPI},
179
+  year        = {2015},
180
+  type        = {techreport},
181
+  url         = {http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/es/wipo_pub_944_2015.pdf},
182
+}
0 183
new file mode 100644
1 184
Binary files /dev/null and b/08_Filosofia_hecha_codigo/bibliografia/recursos/cerlalc2015a.pdf differ
2 185
new file mode 100644
3 186
Binary files /dev/null and b/08_Filosofia_hecha_codigo/bibliografia/recursos/drahos1996a.pdf differ
4 187
new file mode 100644
5 188
Binary files /dev/null and b/08_Filosofia_hecha_codigo/bibliografia/recursos/hegel1971a.pdf differ
6 189
new file mode 100644
7 190
Binary files /dev/null and b/08_Filosofia_hecha_codigo/bibliografia/recursos/hegel2003a.pdf differ
8 191
new file mode 100644
9 192
Binary files /dev/null and b/08_Filosofia_hecha_codigo/bibliografia/recursos/hughes1988a.pdf differ
10 193
new file mode 100644
11 194
Binary files /dev/null and b/08_Filosofia_hecha_codigo/bibliografia/recursos/locke2006a.pdf differ
12 195
new file mode 100644
13 196
Binary files /dev/null and b/08_Filosofia_hecha_codigo/bibliografia/recursos/moore2008a.pdf differ
14 197
new file mode 100644
... ...
@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@
0
+<!DOCTYPE html>
1
+<!--[if lt IE 7]> <html class="ie6 ie"> <![endif]-->
2
+<!--[if IE 7]>    <html class="ie7 ie"> <![endif]-->
3
+<!--[if IE 8]>    <html class="ie8 ie"> <![endif]-->
4
+<!--[if IE 9]>    <html class="ie9 ie"> <![endif]-->
5
+<!--[if !IE]> --> <html> <!-- <![endif]-->
6
+<head>
7
+<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />
8
+<title>
9
+Intellectual Property (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2014 Edition)
10
+</title>
11
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
12
+<meta name="robots" content="noarchive, noodp" />
13
+<meta name="citation_title" content="Intellectual Property" />
14
+<meta name="citation_author" content="Moore, Adam" />
15
+<meta name="citation_author" content="Himma, Ken" />
16
+<meta name="citation_publication_date" content="2011/03/08" />
17
+<meta name="DC.title" content="Intellectual Property" />
18
+<meta name="DC.creator" content="Moore, Adam" />
19
+<meta name="DC.creator" content="Himma, Ken" />
20
+<meta name="DCTERMS.issued" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF" content="2011-03-08" />
21
+<meta name="DCTERMS.modified" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF" content="2014-09-22" />
22
+
23
+<!-- NOTE: Import webfonts using this link: -->
24
+<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Source+Sans+Pro:400,300,600,200&amp;subset=latin,latin-ext" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" />
25
+
26
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" media="screen,handheld" href="../../css/bootstrap.min.css" />
27
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" media="screen,handheld" href="../../css/bootstrap-responsive.min.css" />
28
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../../css/font-awesome.min.css" />
29
+<!--[if IE 7]> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../../css/font-awesome-ie7.min.css"> <![endif]-->
30
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" media="screen,handheld" href="../../css/style.css" />
31
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" media="print" href="../../css/print.css" />
32
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../../css/entry.css" />
33
+<!--[if IE]> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../../css/ie.css" /> <![endif]-->
34
+<script type="text/javascript" src="../../js/jquery-1.9.1.min.js"></script>
35
+<script type="text/javascript" src="../../js/bootstrap.min.js"></script>
36
+
37
+<!-- NOTE: Javascript for sticky behavior needed on article and ToC pages -->
38
+<script type="text/javascript" src="../../js/jquery-scrolltofixed-min.js"></script>
39
+<script type="text/javascript" src="../../js/entry.js"></script>
40
+
41
+<!-- SEP custom script -->
42
+<script type="text/javascript" src="../../js/sep.js"></script>
43
+</head>
44
+
45
+<!-- NOTE: The nojs class is removed from the page if javascript is enabled. Otherwise, it drives the display when there is no javascript. -->
46
+<body class="archive nojs article" id="pagetopright">
47
+<div id="container">
48
+<div id="header-wrapper">
49
+  <div id="header">
50
+    <div id="branding">
51
+      <div id="site-logo"><a href="../../index.html"><img src="../../symbols/sep-man-red.png" alt="SEP logo" /></a></div>
52
+      <div id="site-title"><a href="../../index.html">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive<div id="site-subtitle">Winter 2014 Edition</div></a></div>
53
+    </div>
54
+    <div id="navigation">
55
+      <div class="navbar">
56
+        <div class="navbar-inner">
57
+          <div class="container">
58
+            <button class="btn btn-navbar collapsed" data-target=".collapse-main-menu" data-toggle="collapse" type="button"> <i class="icon-reorder"></i> Menu </button>
59
+            <div class="nav-collapse collapse-main-menu in collapse">
60
+              <ul class="nav">
61
+                <li class="dropdown open"><a id="drop1" href="#" class="dropdown-toggle" data-toggle="dropdown" role="button"><i class="icon-book"></i> Browse</a>
62
+                  <ul class="dropdown-menu" role="menu" aria-labelledby="drop1">
63
+                    <li><a href="../../contents.html">Table of Contents</a></li>
64
+                    <li><a href="../../new.html">New in this Archive</a></li>
65
+                    
66
+                    <li><a href="../../published.html">Chronological</a></li>
67
+                    <li><a href="../../../../archives/">Archives <i class="icon-external-link"></i></a></li>
68
+                  </ul>
69
+                </li>
70
+                <li class="dropdown open"><a id="drop2" href="#" class="dropdown-toggle" data-toggle="dropdown" role="button"><i class="icon-info-sign"></i> About</a>
71
+                  <ul class="dropdown-menu" role="menu" aria-labelledby="drop2">
72
+                    <li><a href="../../info.html">Editorial Information</a></li>
73
+                    <li><a href="../../about.html">About the SEP</a></li>
74
+                    <li><a href="../../board.html">Editorial Board</a></li>
75
+                    <li><a href="../../cite.html">How to Cite the SEP</a></li>
76
+                    <li><a href="../../special-characters.html">Special Characters</a></li>
77
+                    
78
+                    <li><a href="../../../../contact.html">Contact <i class="icon-external-link"></i></a></li>
79
+                  </ul>
80
+                </li>
81
+                <li class="dropdown open"><a id="drop3" href="#" class="dropdown-toggle" data-toggle="dropdown" role="button"><i class="icon-leaf"></i> Support SEP</a>
82
+                  <ul class="dropdown-menu" role="menu" aria-labelledby="drop3">
83
+                    <li><a href="../../../../support/">Support the SEP</a></li>
84
+                    <li><a href="../../../../support/friends.html">PDFs for SEP Friends</a></li>
85
+                    <li><a href="../../../../support/donate.html">Make a Donation</a></li>
86
+                    <li><a href="../../../../support/sepia.html">SEPIA for Libraries</a></li>
87
+                  </ul>
88
+                </li>
89
+              </ul>
90
+            </div>
91
+          </div>
92
+        </div>
93
+      </div>
94
+    </div>
95
+    <!-- End navigation -->
96
+    
97
+    <div id="search">
98
+      <form id="search-form" method="get" action="../../../../search/searcher.py">
99
+        <input type="search" name="query" placeholder="Search this archive" />
100
+<input type="hidden" name="archive" value="win2014" />
101
+
102
+        <div class="search-btn-wrapper"><button class="btn search-btn" type="submit"><i class="icon-search"></i></button></div>
103
+      </form>
104
+    </div>
105
+    <!-- End search --> 
106
+    
107
+  </div>
108
+  <!-- End header --> 
109
+</div>
110
+<!-- End header wrapper -->
111
+
112
+<div id="content">
113
+
114
+<!-- Begin article sidebar -->
115
+<div id="article-sidebar" class="sticky">
116
+  <div class="navbar">
117
+    <div class="navbar-inner">
118
+      <div class="container">
119
+        <button class="btn btn-navbar" data-target=".collapse-sidebar" data-toggle="collapse" type="button"> <i class="icon-reorder"></i> Entry Navigation </button>
120
+        <div id="article-nav" class="nav-collapse collapse-sidebar in collapse">
121
+          <ul class="nav">
122
+            <li><a href="#toc">Entry Contents</a></li>
123
+            <li><a href="#Bib">Bibliography</a></li>
124
+            <li><a href="#Aca">Academic Tools</a></li>
125
+            <li><a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/preview/intellectual-property/">Friends PDF Preview <i class="icon-external-link"></i></a></li>
126
+            <li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=intellectual-property">Author and Citation Info <i class="icon-external-link"></i></a> </li>
127
+            <li><a href="#pagetopright" class="back-to-top">Back to Top <i class="icon-angle-up icon2x"></i></a></li>
128
+          </ul>
129
+        </div>
130
+      </div>
131
+    </div>
132
+  </div>
133
+</div>
134
+<!-- End article sidebar --> 
135
+
136
+<!-- NOTE: Article content must have two wrapper divs: id="article" and id="article-content" -->
137
+<div id="article">
138
+<div id="article-content">
139
+
140
+<!-- BEGIN ARTICLE HTML -->
141
+
142
+
143
+<div id="aueditable"><!--DO NOT MODIFY THIS LINE AND ABOVE-->
144
+
145
+<h1>Intellectual Property</h1><div id="pubinfo"><em>First published Tue Mar 8, 2011; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014</em></div>
146
+
147
+<div id="preamble">
148
+
149
+<p>
150
+
151
+Intellectual property is generally characterized as non-physical
152
+property that is the product of original thought. Typically, rights do
153
+not surround the abstract non-physical entity; rather, intellectual
154
+property rights surround the control of physical manifestations or
155
+expressions of ideas. Intellectual property law protects a
156
+content-creator's interest in her ideas by assigning and enforcing
157
+legal rights to produce and control physical instantiations of those
158
+ideas.</p>
159
+
160
+<p>
161
+
162
+Legal protections for intellectual property have a rich history that
163
+stretches back to ancient Greece and before. As different legal
164
+systems matured in protecting intellectual works, there was a
165
+refinement of what was being protected within different areas.
166
+Over the same period several strands of moral justification for
167
+intellectual property were offered: namely, personality-based,
168
+utilitarian, and Lockean. Finally, there have been numerous
169
+critics of intellectual property and systems of intellectual property
170
+protection. This essay will discuss all of these topics, focusing
171
+on Anglo-American and European legal and moral conceptions of
172
+intellectual property.</p>
173
+
174
+</div>
175
+
176
+<div id="toc">
177
+<!--Entry Contents-->
178
+<ul>
179
+<li><a href="#HisIntPro">1. History of Intellectual Property</a></li>
180
+<li><a href="#DomIntPro">2. The Domain of Intellectual Property</a>
181
+   <ul>
182
+   <li><a href="#Cop">2.1 Copyright</a></li>
183
+   <li><a href="#CreComCopLic">2.2 The Creative Commons, Copyleft, and Licensing</a></li>
184
+   <li><a href="#Pat">2.3 Patents</a></li>
185
+   <li><a href="#TraSec">2.4 Trade Secret</a></li>
186
+   <li><a href="#Tra">2.5 Trademark</a></li>
187
+   <li><a href="#ProMerIde">2.6 Protecting Mere Ideas</a></li>
188
+   <li><a href="#DroMorConSysIntPro">2.7 Droits Morals: Continental Systems of Intellectual Property</a></li>
189
+   </ul></li>
190
+<li><a href="#JusCri">3. Justifications and Critiques</a>
191
+   <ul>
192
+   <li><a href="#PerBasJusIntPro">3.1 Personality-Based Justifications of Intellectual Property</a></li>
193
+   <li><a href="#UtiIncBasArgForIntPro">3.2 The Utilitarian Incentives-Based Argument for Intellectual Property</a></li>
194
+   <li><a href="#LocJusIntPro">3.3 Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property</a></li>
195
+   </ul></li>
196
+<li><a href="#GenCriIntPro">4. General Critiques of Intellectual Property</a>
197
+   <ul>
198
+   <li><a href="#InfNotPro">4.1 Information is Not Property </a></li>
199
+   <li><a href="#42InfNonRiv"> 4.2 Information is Non-Rivalrous</a></li>
200
+   <li><a href="#InfWanFre">4.3 Information Wants to be Free </a></li>
201
+   <li><a href="#FreSpeArgAgaIntPro">4.4 The Free Speech Argument against Intellectual Property</a></li>
202
+   <li><a href="#SocNatInfArg">4.5 The Social Nature of Information Argument</a></li>
203
+   <li><a href="#CosPubDigInf">4.6 The Cost of Publishing Digital Information</a></li>
204
+   </ul></li>
205
+<li><a href="#Bib">Bibliography</a></li>
206
+<li><a href="#Aca">Academic Tools</a></li>
207
+<li><a href="#Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></li>
208
+<li><a href="#Rel">Related Entries</a></li>
209
+</ul>
210
+<!--Entry Contents-->
211
+
212
+<hr />
213
+
214
+</div>
215
+
216
+<div id="main-text">
217
+
218
+<h2><a id="HisIntPro">1. History of Intellectual Property</a></h2>
219
+
220
+<p>
221
+
222
+One of the first known references to intellectual property
223
+protection dates from 500 B.C.E., when chefs in the Greek colony of
224
+Sybaris were granted year-long monopolies for creating particular
225
+culinary delights. There are at least three other notable
226
+references to intellectual property in ancient times&mdash;these
227
+cases are cited in Bruce Bugbee's formidable work <em>The Genesis of
228
+American Patent and Copyright Law</em> (Bugbee 1967). In the
229
+first case, Vitruvius (257&ndash;180 B.C.E.) is said to have revealed
230
+intellectual property theft during a literary contest in
231
+Alexandria. While serving as judge in the contest, Vitruvius
232
+exposed the false poets who were then tried, convicted, and disgraced
233
+for stealing the words and phrases of others.</p>
234
+
235
+<p>
236
+
237
+The second and third cases also come from Roman times (first century
238
+C.E.). Although there is no known Roman law protecting
239
+intellectual property, Roman jurists did discuss the different
240
+ownership interests associated with an intellectual work and how the
241
+work was codified&mdash;e.g., the ownership of a painting and the
242
+ownership of a table upon which the painting appears. There is also
243
+reference to literary piracy by the Roman epigrammatist Martial.
244
+In this case, Fidentinus is caught reciting the works of Martial
245
+without citing the source.</p>
246
+
247
+<p>
248
+
249
+These examples are generally thought to be atypical; as far as we know,
250
+there were no institutions or conventions of intellectual property
251
+protection in Ancient Greece or Rome. From Roman times to the
252
+birth of the Florentine Republic, however, there were many franchises,
253
+privileges, and royal favors granted surrounding the rights to
254
+intellectual works. Bugbee distinguishes between franchises or
255
+royal favors and systems of intellectual property in the following way:
256
+franchises and royal favors restrict access to intellectual works
257
+already in the public domain, thus these decrees take something from
258
+the people. An inventor, on the other hand, deprives the public
259
+of nothing that existed prior to the act of invention (Bugbee
260
+1967). One of the first statutes that protected authors'
261
+rights was issued by the Republic of Florence on June 19, 1421, to
262
+Filippo Brunelleschi, a famous architect. This statute not only
263
+recognized the rights of authors and inventors to the products of their
264
+intellectual efforts; it built in an incentive mechanism that became a
265
+prominent feature of Anglo-American intellectual property protection.
266
+For several reasons, including Guild influence, the Florentine patent
267
+statute of 1421 issued only the single patent to Brunelleschi. The
268
+basis of the first lasting patent institution of intellectual property
269
+protection is found in a 1474 statute of the Venetian Republic.
270
+This statute appeared 150 years before England's Statute of Monopolies;
271
+moreover, the system was sophisticated. The rights of inventors were
272
+recognized, an incentive mechanism was included, compensation for
273
+infringement was established, and a term limit on inventors'
274
+rights was imposed.</p>
275
+
276
+<p>
277
+
278
+American institutions of intellectual property protection are based
279
+on the English system that began with the Statute of Monopolies (1624)
280
+and the Statute of Anne (1710). The Statute of Monopolies granted
281
+fourteen-year monopolies to authors and inventors and ended the
282
+practice of granting rights to &ldquo;non-original/new&rdquo; ideas or works
283
+already in the public domain. In contrast to patent institutions
284
+in Europe, literary works remained largely unprotected until the
285
+arrival of Gutenberg's printing press in the fifteenth century.
286
+Even then there were few true copyrights granted&mdash;most were
287
+grants, privileges, and monopolies.</p>
288
+
289
+<p>
290
+
291
+The Statute of Anne (1710) is considered by scholars to be the first
292
+statute of modern copyright. The statute begins:</p>
293
+
294
+<blockquote>
295
+
296
+&ldquo;Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have lately
297
+frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing
298
+books without the consent of the authors and proprietors &hellip; to
299
+their very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their
300
+families: for preventing therefore such practices for the future, and
301
+for the encouragement of learned men to compose and write use books, be
302
+it enacted &hellip;&rdquo; (Great Britain, <em>Statute of Anne</em>,
303
+1710)</blockquote>
304
+
305
+<p>
306
+
307
+The law gave protection to the author by granting fourteen-year
308
+copyrights, with a fourteen-year renewal possible if the author was
309
+still alive.</p>
310
+
311
+<p>
312
+
313
+In the landmark English case <em>Miller v. Taylor</em> (1769), the inherent
314
+rights of authors to control what they produce, independent of statute
315
+or law, was affirmed. While this case was later overruled in
316
+<em>Donaldson v. Becket</em> (1774), the practice of recognizing the
317
+rights of authors had begun. Other European countries, including
318
+Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Switzerland, followed the example set by
319
+England (Bugbee, 1967). Various more recent international
320
+treaties like the Berne Convention treaty and the TRIPS agreement have
321
+expanded the geographic scope of intellectual property protection to
322
+include most of the globe (Moore 2001).</p>
323
+
324
+<h2><a id="DomIntPro">2. The Domain of Intellectual Property</a></h2>
325
+
326
+<p>
327
+
328
+At the most practical level, the subject matter of intellectual
329
+property is largely codified in Anglo-American copyright, patent, and
330
+trade secret law, as well as in the moral rights granted to authors and
331
+inventors within the continental European doctrine. Although
332
+these systems of property encompass much of what is thought to count as
333
+intellectual property, they do not map out the entire landscape.
334
+Even so, Anglo-American systems of copyright, patent, trade secret, and
335
+trademark, along with certain continental doctrines, provide a rich
336
+starting point for understanding intellectual property (Moore 1998,
337
+2001). We'll take them up in turn.</p>
338
+
339
+<h3><a id="Cop">2.1 Copyright</a></h3>
340
+
341
+<p>
342
+
343
+The domain of copyright protection is original works of authorship
344
+fixed in any tangible medium of expression (17 U.S.C. &sect;102
345
+(1988)). Works that may be copyrighted include literary, musical,
346
+artistic, photographic, architectural, and cinematographic works;
347
+maps; and computer software. For something to be protected, it must be
348
+&ldquo;original&rdquo;&mdash;the work must be the author's own
349
+production; it cannot be the result of copying (<em>Bleistein v.
350
+Donaldson Lithographing Co</em>., 188 U.S. 239 (1903)). A further
351
+requirement that limits the domain of what can be copyrighted is that
352
+the expression must be &ldquo;non-utilitarian&rdquo; or
353
+&ldquo;non-functional&rdquo; in nature. Utilitarian products, or
354
+products that are useful for work, fall, if they fall anywhere, within
355
+the domain of patents.  Finally, rights only extend over the actual
356
+concrete expression and the derivatives of the expression&mdash;not to
357
+the abstract ideas themselves For example, Einstein's Theory of
358
+Relativity, as expressed in various articles and publications, is not
359
+protected under copyright law. Someone else may read these
360
+publications and express the theory in her own words and even receive
361
+a copyright for her particular expression. Some may find this
362
+troubling, but such rights are outside the domain of copyright
363
+law. The individual who copies abstract theories and expresses them in
364
+her own words may be guilty of plagiarism, but she cannot be held
365
+liable for copyright infringement.</p>
366
+
367
+<p>
368
+
369
+There are five exclusive rights that copyright owners enjoy, and three
370
+major restrictions on the bundle. The five rights are: the right
371
+to reproduce the work, the right to adapt it or derive other works from
372
+it, the right to distribute copies of the work, the right to display
373
+the work publicly, and the right to perform it publicly. Under
374
+U.S. copyright law, each of these rights may be individually parsed out
375
+and sold separately by the copyright owner. All five rights lapse
376
+after the lifetime of the author plus 70 years&mdash;or in the case
377
+of works for hire, the term is set at 95 years from publication or 120
378
+years from creation, whichever comes first. Aside from limited
379
+duration (17 U.S.C. &sect;302), the rules of fair use (17 U.S.C.
380
+&sect;107) and first sale (17 U.S.C. &sect;109(a)) also restrict the
381
+rights of copyright owners. Although the notion of &ldquo;fair use&rdquo; is
382
+notoriously hard to spell out, it is a generally recognized principle
383
+of Anglo-American copyright law that allows anyone to make limited use
384
+of another's copyrighted work for such purposes as criticism, comment,
385
+news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. The
386
+&ldquo;first sale&rdquo; rule prevents a copyright holder who has sold
387
+copies of a protected work from later interfering with the subsequent
388
+sale of those copies. In short, the owners of copies can do what
389
+they like with their property, short of violating the copyrights
390
+mentioned above.</p>
391
+
392
+<h3><a id="CreComCopLic">2.2 The Creative Commons, Copyleft, and Licensing</a></h3>
393
+
394
+<p>
395
+
396
+As a modern workaround for the first sale rule, many online content
397
+providers, rather than selling a copy of a work, simply offer licensing
398
+agreements (through click-wrap, shrink-wrap, etc.) that allow only
399
+specific uses of protected content. These approaches to protecting
400
+intellectual works are relatively new and seemingly build upon the
401
+copyright systems already in place. For example, by using
402
+licensing agreements to guarantee different levels of downstream
403
+access, the Creative Commons and Copyleft models seek to expand the
404
+commons of thought and expression (Stallman 1997; Lessig 2004).
405
+An owner may allow others to build upon a protected work provided that
406
+the &ldquo;new&rdquo; work is similarly accessible or usable.</p>
407
+
408
+<h3><a id="Pat">2.3 Patents</a></h3>
409
+
410
+<p>
411
+
412
+The domain or subject matter of patent law is the invention and
413
+discovery of new and useful processes, machines, articles of
414
+manufacture, or compositions of matter. There are three types of
415
+patents recognized by patent law: utility patents, design patents, and
416
+plant patents. Utility patents protect any new, useful, and nonobvious
417
+process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, as
418
+well as any new and useful improvement thereof. Design patents protect
419
+any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of
420
+manufacture. Finally, the subject matter of a plant patent is any new
421
+variety of plant. Patent protection is the strongest form of
422
+intellectual property protection, in that a twenty-year exclusive
423
+monopoly is granted to the owner over any expression or implementation
424
+of the protected work (35 U.S.C. &sect;101 (1988) and 35
425
+U.S.C. &sect;154(a)(2)). </p>
426
+
427
+<p>
428
+
429
+As with copyright, there are restrictions on the domain of patent
430
+protection. The U.S. Patent Act requires usefulness, novelty, and
431
+non-obviousness of the subject matter. The usefulness requirement
432
+is typically deemed satisfied if the invention can accomplish at least
433
+one of its intended purposes. Needless to say, given the expense
434
+of obtaining a patent, most machines, articles of manufacture, and
435
+processes are useful in this minimal sense.</p>
436
+
437
+<p>
438
+
439
+ A
440
+more robust requirement on the subject matter of a patent is that the
441
+invention defined in the claim for patent protection must be new or
442
+novel. There are several categories or events, all defined by
443
+statute, that can anticipate and invalidate a claim of a patent (35
444
+U.S.C. &sect;101 (1988)). In general, the novelty requirement
445
+invalidates patent claims if the invention was publicly known before
446
+the patent applicant invented it.</p>
447
+
448
+<p>
449
+
450
+In addition to utility and novelty, the third restriction on
451
+patentability is non-obviousness. United States patent law requires
452
+that the invention not be obvious to one ordinarily skilled in the
453
+relevant art at the time the invention was made. A hypothetical
454
+individual is constructed and the question is asked, &ldquo;Would this
455
+invention be obvious to an expert in the relevant field?&rdquo; If it
456
+would be obvious to this imaginary individual then the patent claim
457
+fails the test (35 U.S.C. &sect;103).</p>
458
+
459
+<p>
460
+
461
+In return for public disclosure and the ensuing dissemination of
462
+information, the patent holder is granted the right to make, use,
463
+sell, and authorize others to sell the patented item (35
464
+U.S.C. &sect;154 (1984 and Supp. 1989)). The bundle of rights
465
+conferred by a patent excludes others from making, using, or selling
466
+the invention regardless of independent creation. Like copyright,
467
+patent rights lapse after a given period of time&mdash;20 years for
468
+utility and plant patents, 14 for design patents. But unlike copyright
469
+protection, during their period of applicability these rights preclude
470
+others who independently invent the same process or machine from being
471
+able to patent or market their invention.</p>
472
+
473
+<h3><a id="TraSec">2.4 Trade Secret</a></h3>
474
+
475
+<p>
476
+
477
+The subject matter of trade secret law is almost unlimited in terms of
478
+the content or subject matter that may be protected and typically
479
+relies on private measures, rather than state action, to preserve
480
+exclusivity. &ldquo;A trade secret is any information that can be used
481
+in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
482
+sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential
483
+economic advantage over others&rdquo; (U.S. Legal Code, The
484
+Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, 1995, &sect;39). The secret
485
+may be a formula for a chemical compound; a process of manufacturing,
486
+treating, or preserving materials; a pattern for a machine or other
487
+device; or a list of customers.</p>
488
+
489
+<p>
490
+
491
+The two major restrictions on the domain of trade secrets are the
492
+requirements of secrecy and competitive advantage. An
493
+intellectual work is not a secret if it is generally known within the
494
+industry, published in trade journals, reference books, etc., or
495
+readily copyable from products on the market.</p>
496
+
497
+<p>
498
+
499
+Although trade secret rights have no built-in expiration, they are
500
+extremely limited in one important respect. Owners of trade
501
+secrets have exclusive rights to make use of the secret only as long as
502
+the secret is maintained. If the secret is made public by the
503
+owner, then trade secret protection lapses and anyone can make use of
504
+it. Moreover, owners' rights do not exclude independent
505
+invention or discovery. Within the secrecy requirement, owners of
506
+trade secrets enjoy management rights and are protected from
507
+misappropriation. This latter protection is probably the most
508
+important right granted, given the proliferation of industrial
509
+espionage and employee theft of intellectual works.</p>
510
+
511
+<h3><a id="Tra">2.5 Trademark</a></h3>
512
+
513
+<p>
514
+
515
+The domain or subject matter of trademark is, generally speaking, the
516
+good will or good name of a company. A trademark is any word,
517
+name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, adopted by a
518
+manufacturer or merchant to identify her goods and distinguish them
519
+from goods produced by others (15 U.S.C. &sect;1127 (1988)).</p>
520
+
521
+<p>
522
+
523
+ A major restriction on what can count as a trademark is whether or
524
+not the symbol is used in everyday language. In this respect, owners
525
+of trademarks do not want their symbols to become too widely used
526
+because once this occurs, the trademark lapses. An example of this
527
+restriction eliminating a word from trademark protection is
528
+&ldquo;aspirin&rdquo;&mdash;as the word became a part of the common
529
+culture, rights to exclusively use the trademark lapsed.</p>
530
+
531
+<p>
532
+
533
+Ownership of a trademark confers upon the property holder the right to
534
+use a particular mark or symbol and the right to exclude others from
535
+using the same (or similar) mark or symbol. The duration of these
536
+rights is limited only in cases where the mark or symbol ceases to
537
+represent a company or interest, or becomes entrenched as part of the
538
+common language or culture.</p>
539
+
540
+<h3><a id="ProMerIde">2.6 Protecting Mere Ideas</a></h3>
541
+
542
+<p>
543
+
544
+Outside of the regimes of copyright, patent, trade secret, and
545
+trademark, there is a substantial set of case law that allows
546
+individuals to protect mere ideas as personal property. This system of
547
+property is typically called the &ldquo;law of ideas&rdquo; (Epstein
548
+1992). A highly publicized case in this area is <em>Buchwald v.
549
+Paramount Pictures</em> (13 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1497 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1990)),
550
+concerning the Eddie Murphy movie <em>Coming to America</em>.</p>
551
+
552
+<p>
553
+
554
+The law of ideas is typically applied in cases where individuals
555
+produce ideas and submit them to corporations expecting to be
556
+compensated. In certain cases, when these ideas are used by the
557
+corporation (or anyone) without authorization, compensation may be
558
+required. Before concluding that an author has property rights to
559
+her idea(s), courts require the idea(s) to be novel or original
560
+(<em>Murray v. National Broadcasting,</em> 844 U.S. F2d 988 (Second
561
+Cir. 1988)) and concrete (<em>Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt</em> (D.C.
562
+Cir. 1953)). Compensation is offered only in cases of
563
+misappropriation (<em>Sellers v. American Broadcasting Co</em>. (11th
564
+Cir. 1982)).</p>
565
+
566
+<h3><a id="DroMorConSysIntPro">2.7 Droits Morals: Continental Systems of Intellectual Property</a></h3>
567
+
568
+<p>
569
+
570
+Article 6<em>bis</em> of the Berne Convention articulates the notion
571
+of &ldquo;moral rights&rdquo; that are included in continental
572
+European intellectual property law. The doctrine protects the personal
573
+rights of creators, as distinguished from their economic rights, and
574
+is generally known in France as &ldquo;droits morals&rdquo; or
575
+&ldquo;moral rights.&rdquo; These moral rights consist of the right to
576
+create and to publish a work in any form desired, the creator's right
577
+to claim the authorship of his work, the right to prevent any
578
+deformation, mutilation or other modification thereof, the right to
579
+withdraw and destroy the work, the prohibition against excessive
580
+criticism, and the prohibition against all other injuries to the
581
+creator's personality (Roeder 1940).</p>
582
+
583
+<h2><a id="JusCri">3. Justifications and Critiques</a></h2>
584
+
585
+<p>
586
+
587
+Arguments for intellectual property rights have generally taken one
588
+of three forms (Hughes 1988; Moore 2008). Personality theorists
589
+maintain that intellectual property is an extension of individual
590
+personality. Utilitarians ground intellectual property rights in social
591
+progress and incentives to innovate. Lockeans argue that rights
592
+are justified in relation to labor and merit. While each of these
593
+strands of justification has its weaknesses, there are also strengths
594
+unique to each.</p>
595
+
596
+<h3><a id="PerBasJusIntPro">3.1 Personality-Based Justifications of Intellectual Property</a></h3>
597
+
598
+<p>
599
+
600
+Personality theorists such as Hegel maintain that individuals have
601
+moral claims to their own talents, feelings, character traits, and
602
+experiences. We are self-owners in this sense. Control over physical
603
+and intellectual objects is essential for self-actualization&mdash;by
604
+expanding our selves outward beyond our own minds and mixing these
605
+selves with tangible and intangible items, we both define ourselves
606
+and obtain control over our goals and projects. For Hegel, the
607
+external actualization of the human will requires property (Hegel,
608
+1821). Property rights are important in two ways according to this
609
+view. First, by controlling and manipulating objects, both tangible
610
+and intangible, our will takes form in the world and we obtain a
611
+measure of freedom. Individuals may use their physical and
612
+intellectual property rights, for example, to shield their private
613
+lives from public scrutiny and to facilitate life-long project
614
+pursuit. Second, in some cases our personality becomes fused with an
615
+object&mdash;thus moral claims to control feelings, character traits,
616
+and experiences may be expanded to intangible works (Humboldt, 1792;
617
+Kohler, 1969).</p>
618
+
619
+<h4>3.1.1 Problems for Personality-Based Justifications of Intellectual
620
+Property</h4>
621
+
622
+<p>
623
+
624
+There are at least four problems with this view (Hughes 1988; Palmer
625
+2005; Schroeder 2006). First, it is not clear that we own our
626
+feelings, character traits, and experiences. While it is true
627
+that we have possession of these things or that they are a part of each
628
+of us, an argument is needed to establish the relevant moral
629
+claims.</p>
630
+
631
+<p>
632
+
633
+Second, even if it could be established that individuals own or have
634
+moral claims to their personality, it does not automatically follow
635
+that such claims are expanded when personalities become infused in
636
+tangible or intangible works. Rather than establishing property
637
+claims to such works, perhaps we should view this as an abandonment of
638
+personality&mdash;similar to the sloughing off of hair and skin
639
+cells. Moreover, misrepresenting an intellectual work (assuming
640
+there are no moral rights to these expressions) might change the
641
+perception of an author's personality, but it would not in fact
642
+change their personality.</p>
643
+
644
+<p>
645
+
646
+Third, assuming that moral claims to personality could be expanded
647
+to tangible or intangible items, we would still need an argument
648
+justifying property rights. Personality-based moral claims may
649
+warrant nothing more than use rights or prohibitions against
650
+alteration. Finally, there are many intellectual innovations in
651
+which there is no evidence of a creator's personality&mdash;a
652
+list of customers or a new safety-pin design, for instance (Hughes
653
+1988). Given these challenges, personality-based theories may not
654
+provide a strong moral foundation for legal systems of intellectual
655
+property.</p>
656
+
657
+<h4>3.1.2 The Personality Theorist's Rejoinder</h4>
658
+
659
+<p>
660
+
661
+Even if we acknowledge the force of these objections, there does seem
662
+to be something intuitively appealing about personality-based theories
663
+of intellectual property rights (Moore 2008). Suppose, for
664
+example, that Mr. Friday buys a painting at a garage sale&mdash;a
665
+long-lost Crusoe original. Friday takes the painting home and
666
+alters the painting with a marker, drawing horns and mustaches on the
667
+figures in the painting. The additions are so clever and fit so
668
+nicely into the painting that Friday hangs it in a window on a busy
669
+street. There are at least two ethical worries to consider in
670
+this case. First, the alterations by Friday may cause unjustified
671
+economic damage to Crusoe. Second, and independent of the
672
+economic considerations, Friday's actions may damage
673
+Crusoe's reputation. The integrity of the painting has been
674
+violated without the consent of the author, perhaps causing long-term
675
+damage to his reputation and community standing. If these claims
676
+are sensible, then it appears that we are acknowledging
677
+personality-based moral &ldquo;strings&rdquo; attaching to certain
678
+intellectual works. By producing intellectual works, authors and
679
+inventors put themselves on display, so-to-speak, and incur certain
680
+risks. Intellectual property rights afford authors and inventors
681
+a measure of control over this risk. To put the point a different
682
+way, it is the moral claims that attach to personality, reputation, and
683
+the physical embodiments of these individual goods that justify legal
684
+rules covering damage to reputation and certain sorts of economic
685
+losses.</p>
686
+
687
+<p>
688
+
689
+Moreover, personality-based theories of intellectual property often
690
+appeal to other moral considerations. Hegel's
691
+personality-based justification of intellectual property rights
692
+included an incentive-based component as well&mdash;he asserts that
693
+protecting the sciences promotes them, benefiting society (Hegel,
694
+1821). Perhaps the best way to protect these intuitively
695
+attractive personality-based claims to intangible works is to adopt a
696
+more comprehensive system designed to promote progress and social
697
+utility.</p>
698
+
699
+<h3><a id="UtiIncBasArgForIntPro">3.2 The Utilitarian Incentives-Based Argument for Intellectual Property</a></h3>
700
+
701
+<p>
702
+
703
+In terms of &ldquo;justification,&rdquo; modern Anglo-American systems
704
+of intellectual property are typically modeled as incentive-based and
705
+utilitarian (Oppenheim 1951; Machlup 1962; Boonin 1989; Hettinger
706
+1989; Mackaay 1990; Coskery 1993; Palmer 1997; Moore 2001,
707
+2003). On this view, a necessary condition for promoting the
708
+creation of valuable intellectual works is granting limited rights of
709
+ownership to authors and inventors. Absent certain guarantees,
710
+authors and inventors might not engage in producing intellectual
711
+property. Thus control is granted to authors and inventors of
712
+intellectual property, because granting such control provides
713
+incentives necessary for social progress. Although success is not
714
+ensured by granting these rights, failure is inevitable if those who
715
+incur no investment costs can seize and reproduce the intellectual
716
+effort of others (Moore 2001, 2003). Adopting systems of protection
717
+like copyright, patent, and trade secret yields an optimal amount of
718
+intellectual works being produced, and a corresponding optimal amount
719
+of social utility. Coupled with the theoretical claim that
720
+society ought to maximize social utility, we arrive at a simple yet
721
+powerful argument for the protection of intellectual property
722
+rights.</p>
723
+
724
+<h4>3.2.1 The Character of the Utilitarian Incentives-Based Argument: A Problem Shared by Both Sides </h4>
725
+
726
+<p>
727
+
728
+It is crucial to note that the issue of whether intellectual property
729
+protection does, or does not, sufficiently promote human happiness or
730
+well-being is an empirical question that requires empirical data in
731
+the form that the appropriate sociological and economic studies would
732
+provide.  Whether or not, for example, intellectual property
733
+protection provides an incentive that elicits some optimal output of
734
+content creation can be settled only by looking to the empirical
735
+evidence.  Likewise, whether or not intellectual property protection
736
+has the effect of hindering innovation and inhibiting the production
737
+of novel valuable content can be settled only by empirical
738
+evidence.</p>
739
+ 
740
+<p>
741
+At this point, more empirical research is needed by economists and
742
+sociologists, one way or another, to determine the effects of IP
743
+protection on technological and artistic development.  It is helpful
744
+to note that more empirically based research is being done to resolve
745
+these questions.  Carrier (2012), one especially noteworthy recent
746
+example, presents the results of interviews with 31 CEOs about the
747
+results of the Napster case, as well as examines the effects of
748
+copyright litigation.  Although a step in the right direction, Carrier
749
+(2012) illustrates some of the difficulties in obtaining persuasive
750
+empirical evidence.  Interviews, even with CEOs, are anecdotal in
751
+character on an issue that would seem to require, among other things,
752
+a comprehensive examination of the relative effects of providing
753
+various forms of protection to intellectual property on important
754
+indicators of economic efficiency.  The difficulties involved in
755
+obtaining such evidence suggest that the empirical question will
756
+remain debated for some time.</p>
757
+
758
+<h4>3.2.2 Problems for the Utilitarian Incentives-Based Argument</h4>
759
+
760
+<p>
761
+
762
+Given that this argument rests on providing incentives, what is
763
+needed to critique it are cases that illustrate better ways, or equally
764
+good ways, of stimulating production without granting private property
765
+rights to authors and inventors. It would be better to establish
766
+equally powerful incentives for the production of intellectual property
767
+that did not also require initial restricted use guaranteed by rights
768
+(Polanyi 1943; Machlup 1962; Hettinger 1989; Waldron 1993; Moore
769
+2001, 2003; Wright 1998).</p>
770
+
771
+<p>
772
+
773
+One alternative to granting intellectual property rights to inventors
774
+as incentive is government support of intellectual labor (Hettinger,
775
+1989; Calandrillo, 1998). This could take the form of
776
+government-funded research projects, with the results immediately
777
+becoming public property. The question becomes: can government
778
+support of intellectual labor provide enough incentive to authors and
779
+inventors so that an equal or greater amount of intellectual products
780
+are created compared to what is produced by conferring limited property
781
+rights? Better results may also be had if fewer intellectual
782
+works of higher quality were distributed to more people.</p>
783
+
784
+<p>
785
+
786
+Unlike the current government-supported system of intellectual property
787
+rights, reward models may be able to avoid the problems of allowing
788
+monopoly control and restricting access, and at the same time provide
789
+incentives to innovate (Shavell and Van Ypersele 2001). In this
790
+model, innovators would still burn the midnight oil chasing that pot of
791
+gold, and governments would not have to decide which projects to fund
792
+or determine the amount of the rewards before the works'
793
+&ldquo;social value&rdquo; was known. Funds necessary to pay the
794
+rewards could be drawn from taxes or collecting percentages of the
795
+profits of these innovations. Reward models may also avoid the
796
+disadvantages of monopoly pricing, and obstructions to further
797
+adaptation and innovation.</p>
798
+
799
+<p>
800
+
801
+Trade secret protection appears to be the most troubling from a
802
+utilitarian incentives-based perspective (Hettinger 1989). Given that
803
+no disclosure is necessary for trade secret protection, promoting
804
+trade secrets through incentives yields no reciprocal long-term social
805
+benefit. Trade secret protection allows authors and inventors the
806
+right to slow the dissemination of protected information
807
+indefinitely&mdash;a trade secret necessarily requires secrecy.</p>
808
+
809
+<p>
810
+
811
+Finally, empirical questions about the costs and benefits of
812
+copyright, patent, and trade secret protection are notoriously
813
+difficult to determine. Economists who have considered the
814
+question indicate that either the jury is out, or that other
815
+arrangements would be better (Machlup 1962; Priest 1986; Long 2000).
816
+If we cannot appeal to the progress-enhancing features of intellectual
817
+property protection, then the utilitarian can hardly appeal to such
818
+progress as justification.</p>
819
+
820
+<h4>3.2.3 The Utilitarian Rejoinder</h4>
821
+
822
+<p>
823
+
824
+The utilitarian may well agree with many of these criticisms and still
825
+maintain that intellectual property rights, in some form, are
826
+justified&mdash;a system of protection is better than nothing at all.
827
+Putting aside the last criticism, all of the worries surrounding the
828
+incentive-based approach appear to focus on problems of
829
+implementation.  We could tinker with our system of intellectual
830
+property, cutting back on some legal protections and strengthening
831
+others (Coskery 1993). Perhaps we could include more
832
+personality-based restrictions on what can be done with an intangible
833
+work after the first sale, limit the term of copyrights, patents, and
834
+trade secrets to something more reasonable, and find ways to embrace
835
+technologies that promote access while protecting incentives to
836
+innovate. The utilitarian might also remind us of the costs of
837
+changing our system of intellectual property.</p>
838
+
839
+<h3><a id="LocJusIntPro">3.3 Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property</a></h3>
840
+
841
+<p>
842
+
843
+A final strategy for justifying intellectual property rights begins
844
+with the claim that individuals are entitled to control the fruits of
845
+their labor (Hettinger 1989; Becker 1993; Gordon 1993; Moore 1997,
846
+1998, 2001, 2012; Hughes 1988; Palmer 2005; Himma 2005, 2006, 2008).
847
+Laboring, producing, thinking, and persevering are voluntary, and
848
+individuals who engage in these activities are entitled to what they
849
+produce. Subject to certain restrictions, rights are generated
850
+when individuals mix their labor with an unowned object. The
851
+intuition is that the person who clears unowned land, cultivates crops,
852
+builds a house, or creates a new invention obtains property rights by
853
+engaging in these activities.</p>
854
+
855
+<p>
856
+
857
+Consider a more formal version of Locke's famous argument. Individuals
858
+own their own bodies and labor&mdash;i.e., they are self-owners. When
859
+an individual labors on an unowned object, her labor becomes infused
860
+in the object and for the most part, the labor and the object cannot
861
+be separated. It follows that once a person's labor is joined with an
862
+unowned object, assuming that individuals exclusively own their body
863
+and labor, rights to control are generated. The idea is that there is
864
+an expansion of rights: we each own our labor and when that labor is
865
+mixed with objects in the commons, our rights are expanded to include
866
+these goods.</p>
867
+<h4>3.3.1 Objections to Locke</h4>
868
+
869
+<p>
870
+
871
+Locke's argument is not without difficulties. Jeremy
872
+Waldron (1983) argued that the idea of mixing one's labor is
873
+incoherent&mdash;actions cannot be mixed with objects. P. J.
874
+Proudhon (1840) argued that if labor was important, the second labor on
875
+an object should ground a property right in an object as reliably as
876
+the first labor. Nozick (1974) asked why labor mixing generated
877
+property rights rather than a loss of labor. Waldron (1983) and
878
+Perry (1978) have argued that mixing one's labor with an unowned
879
+object should yield more limited rights than rights of full
880
+ownership. Finally, if the skills, tools, and inventions used in
881
+laboring are social products, then perhaps individual claims to title
882
+have been undermined (Grant 1987; Hettinger 1989).</p>
883
+
884
+<h4>3.3.2 The Lockean Rejoinder</h4>
885
+
886
+<p>
887
+
888
+Among defenders of Lockean-based arguments for private property,
889
+these challenges have not gone unnoticed (Spooner 1855; Schmidtz
890
+1990; Mack 1990; Simmons 1992; Child 1990; Moore 1997, 2001, 2012).
891
+Rather than rehearsing the points and counterpoints,
892
+consider a modified version of the Lockean argument&mdash;one that
893
+does not so easily fall prey to the objections mentioned above (Moore,
894
+2001, 2012):</p>
895
+
896
+<p>
897
+
898
+After weeks of effort and numerous failures, suppose Ginger comes up
899
+with an excellent new recipe for spicy Chinese noodles&mdash;a recipe
900
+that she keeps in her mind and does not write down. Would anyone argue
901
+that Ginger does not have at least some minimal moral claim to control
902
+the recipe? Suppose that Fred samples some of Ginger's noodles and
903
+desires to purchase the recipe. Is there anything morally suspicious
904
+with an agreement between them that grants Fred a limited right to
905
+use Ginger's recipe provided that Fred does not disclose the process?
906
+Alas, Fred didn't have to agree to the terms and, no matter how tasty
907
+the noodles, he could eat something else or create his own
908
+recipe. Arguably, part of the moral weightiness of the agreement
909
+between Ginger and Fred relies on the fact that Ginger holds legitimate
910
+title to the recipe.</p>
911
+
912
+<p> In small communities it may even be possible to contract with all
913
+of one's fellows securing all or some of the bundle of full ownership.
914
+In this sort of example, every single member of the community would be
915
+directly part of the agreement.  Ginger says to her peers, &ldquo;if you
916
+want access to my recipe, then you will have to agree to my right to
917
+enjoy income&rdquo; and they reply &ldquo;but such rights can't be indefinite
918
+&hellip; we as a community won't be on the hook for defending this
919
+agreement indefinitely.&rdquo;  In the ensuing give-and-take an agreement is
920
+hammered out.  It is important to note that the moral bindingness of
921
+such an agreement is crucially dependent on the initial set of
922
+entitlement claims generated by labor, desert, and non-worsening.  If
923
+Ginger, in this case, was not the author of the recipe &mdash; suppose
924
+she took it from someone else &mdash; it is not at all clear that the
925
+resulting contract would be morally or legally binding.</p>
926
+
927
+<p>
928
+Moving from small communities to larger ones a more general form of
929
+agreement between authors, inventors, and society can be considered.
930
+If intellectual works are to be held as anything other than trade
931
+secrets, walled off with narrow contracts like non-disclosure
932
+agreements or non-competition arrangements, there must be a way of
933
+securing access.  Society may purchase access by offering limited
934
+rights to authors and inventors.  Moreover, if some society does not
935
+offer this sort of protection, then innovators would likely employ
936
+their talents in other areas or simply move to a society where such
937
+agreements are recognized (Moore 2012).  </p>
938
+
939
+<h2><a id="GenCriIntPro">4. General Critiques of Intellectual Property</a></h2>
940
+
941
+<p>
942
+
943
+Putting aside the strands of argument that seek to justify moral
944
+claims to intangible works and the rather focused problems with these
945
+views, there are several general critiques of the rights to control
946
+intellectual property to consider.</p>
947
+
948
+<h3><a id="InfNotPro">4.1 Information is Not Property </a></h3>
949
+
950
+<p>
951
+
952
+Critics argue that information is not the kind of thing that can be
953
+owned or possessed and is not something that can be property, as that
954
+notion is typically defined.  Information objects, such as numbers and
955
+propositions are abstract objects, which cannot causally interact with
956
+material objects, and hence cannot be owned or possessed.  The idea,
957
+for example, that one could, in the relevant sense, possess and hence
958
+own the novel expressed by the book <em>A Tale of Two Cities</em>
959
+makes as little sense as the idea that one could possess and hence own
960
+the entity denoted by the symbol &ldquo;2.&rdquo; Whatever concepts
961
+might properly be applied to abstract objects, on this view, the
962
+concept of property, according to these theorists, does not.  As a
963
+conceptual matter, the term &ldquo;intellectual property,&rdquo; at
964
+best, applies to nothing and, at worst, is incoherent. </p>
965
+
966
+<p>This analysis is vulnerable to at least two objections.  First, it
967
+is not clear that ownership, as a conceptual matter, requires physical
968
+possession.  One can argue that the essence of ownership consists in a
969
+power &mdash; the power to exclude others from certain behaviors
970
+involving the relevant entity &mdash; and not in physical control or
971
+possession of the entity. Second, the claim that information objects
972
+cannot be property does not imply that it is illegitimate to grant to
973
+authors or content-creators a legal right to exclude others from
974
+appropriating those objects without their consent.  That some entity E
975
+is not &ldquo;property&rdquo; implies only that it should not be legally protected
976
+qua property; it does not imply that E should not be protected in very
977
+similar ways.  It might be that such legal rights should be called
978
+something other than &ldquo;intellectual property rights,&rdquo; but these rights
979
+could be called something else, such as, for example, &ldquo;intellectual
980
+content rights.&rdquo;</p>
981
+
982
+<h3><a id="42InfNonRiv"> 4.2 Information is Non-Rivalrous</a></h3>
983
+
984
+<p>
985
+
986
+Many have argued that the non-rivalrous nature of intellectual works
987
+grounds a prima facie case against rights to restrict access.
988
+Since intellectual works are not typically consumed by their use and
989
+can be used by many individuals concurrently (making a copy does not
990
+deprive anyone of their possessions), we have a strong case against
991
+moral and legal intellectual property rights (Kuflik 1989; Hettinger
992
+1989; Barlow 1997). One reason for the widespread pirating of
993
+intellectual works is that many people think restricting access to
994
+these works is unjustified. Consider a more formal version of
995
+this argument:</p>
996
+
997
+<dl class="hangindent">
998
+
999
+<dt>P1.</dt><dd> If a tangible or intangible work can be used and consumed by
1000
+many individuals concurrently (is non-rivalrous), then maximal access
1001
+and use should be permitted.</dd>
1002
+
1003
+<dt>
1004
+P2.</dt><dd> Intellectual works falling under the domains of copyright,
1005
+patent, and trade secret protection are non-rivalrous.</dd>
1006
+
1007
+<dt>
1008
+C3.</dt><dd> It follows that there is an immediate prima facie case
1009
+<em>against</em> intellectual property rights, or <em>for</em> allowing
1010
+maximal access to intellectual works.</dd>
1011
+</dl>
1012
+
1013
+<p>
1014
+
1015
+The weak point in this argument is the first premise (Moore 2001, 2010, 2012;
1016
+Himma, 2005). Consider sensitive personal information.
1017
+Moore argues that it false to claim that just because this information
1018
+can be used and consumed by many individuals concurrently, a prima
1019
+facie moral claim to maximal access is established. This argument
1020
+applies as well to snuff films, obscene pornography, information
1021
+related to national security, personal financial information, and
1022
+private thoughts; each are non-rivalrous, but this fact does not by
1023
+itself generate prima facie moral claims for maximal access and
1024
+use. Moreover, it is not clear that unauthorized copying does no
1025
+harm to the owner even in cases where the copier would not have
1026
+purchased a copy legitimately (and thus is not denying the owner
1027
+economic compensation they would otherwise receive). Unauthorized
1028
+copying creates un-consented to risks that owners must
1029
+shoulder.</p>
1030
+
1031
+<p>
1032
+
1033
+Himma points out that, by itself, the claim that consumption of
1034
+information is non-rivalrous does not imply that we have a right of any
1035
+kind to those objects. While this certainly provides a reason
1036
+against thinking protection of intellectual property is morally
1037
+justified, it does not tell us anything about whether we have a right
1038
+of some sort because it does not contain any information about morally
1039
+relevant properties of human beings&mdash;and the justification of
1040
+general rights-claims necessarily rests on attributions of value that
1041
+implicitly respond to interests of beings with the appropriate level of
1042
+moral standing&mdash;in our case, our status as persons (Himma
1043
+2005).</p>
1044
+
1045
+<h3><a id="InfWanFre">4.3 Information Wants to be Free </a></h3>
1046
+
1047
+<p> Barlow (1997) argues that information is entitled to moral
1048
+consideration in virtue of being alive.  On his view, information is a
1049
+form of life with a claim to be free that is grounded in interests and
1050
+&ldquo;wants&rdquo; of its own.  As he puts the point, information
1051
+objects &ldquo;are life forms in every respect but a basis in the
1052
+carbon atom.  They self-reproduce, they interact with their
1053
+surroundings and adapt to them, they mutate, they persist.&rdquo;
1054
+Further, these living information objects have some sort of interest
1055
+in being made available to everyone free of charge.</p>
1056
+
1057
+<p> Barlow's argument can be challenged on a couple of grounds.
1058
+First, Himma (2005) argues that it is simply implausible to think of
1059
+abstract objects as having wants &mdash; or even interests. The
1060
+concept of desire is such that only conscious beings are capable of
1061
+having desires; although a conscious being can have subconscious
1062
+desires, non-sentient entitles are no more accurately characterized as
1063
+having desires than as having hopes.  Second, even if information
1064
+objects had wants or interests, Barlow gives no reason for thinking
1065
+that they have a desire to, or interest in being made freely available
1066
+to all.  Certainly, the claim that being made freely available to all
1067
+somehow benefits information objects needs an argument if for no other
1068
+reason than that it is counterintuitive.</p>
1069
+
1070
+<h3><a id="FreSpeArgAgaIntPro">4.4 The Free Speech Argument against Intellectual Property</a></h3>
1071
+
1072
+<p>
1073
+According to some, permitting intellectual property rights are
1074
+inconsistent with our commitment to freedom of thought and speech
1075
+(Nimmer 1970; Hettinger 1989; Waldron 1993). Hettinger argues that
1076
+intellectual property &ldquo;restricts methods of acquiring ideas (as
1077
+do trade secrets), it restricts the use of ideas (as do patents), and
1078
+it restricts the expression of ideas (as do
1079
+copyrights)&mdash;restrictions undesirable for a number of
1080
+reasons&rdquo; (Hettinger 1989). Hettinger singles out trade secrets
1081
+as the most troublesome because, unlike patents and copyrights, they
1082
+do not require disclosure.</p>
1083
+
1084
+<p>
1085
+
1086
+Three sorts of replies have been offered to this kind of worry (Himma
1087
+2006, Moore 2010, 2012). The first notes that it is the incentives
1088
+found in providing limited protection that fosters the creation and
1089
+dissemination of information&mdash;a system of intellectual property
1090
+protection may cause restricted access in the short run, but overall,
1091
+the commons of thought and expression is enhanced. </p>
1092
+
1093
+<p>Second, it is not at all clear that free speech is so presumptively
1094
+weighty that it nearly always trumps other values. Shouting at someone
1095
+over a bullhorn all day is not something we would countenance as
1096
+protected free speech (Moore 2010, 2012). Hate speech, obscene
1097
+expressions, sexual harassment, and broadcasting private medical
1098
+information about others are each examples of speech that we are
1099
+willing to limit for various reasons&mdash;perhaps intellectual
1100
+property rights can be viewed in this light.</p>
1101
+
1102
+<p>Finally, consider the contentious, yet established, idea/expression
1103
+rule of copyright.  Copyright only applies to fixed expressions, not
1104
+to the ideas that may make up a fixed expression. For example, someone
1105
+may read Darwin's original writings on evolution, express these ideas
1106
+in her own words, and obtain a copyright in the new expression.  This
1107
+individual may be guilty of plagiarism, but so long as her expressions
1108
+are not copied from Einstein's original or substantially similar to
1109
+the original, she can obtain a copyright (Moore 2012).  </p>
1110
+
1111
+<h3><a id="SocNatInfArg">4.5 The Social Nature of Information Argument</a></h3>
1112
+
1113
+<p>
1114
+
1115
+According to this view, information is a social product and enforcing
1116
+access restrictions unduly benefits authors and inventors.
1117
+Individuals are raised in societies that endow them with knowledge
1118
+which these individuals then use to create intellectual works of all
1119
+kinds. On this view the building blocks of intellectual
1120
+works&mdash;knowledge&mdash;is a social product. Individuals should
1121
+not have exclusive and perpetual ownership of the works that they
1122
+create because these works are built upon the shared knowledge of
1123
+society. Allowing rights to intellectual works would be similar to
1124
+granting ownership to the individual who placed the last brick in a
1125
+public works dam. The dam is a social product, built up by the efforts
1126
+of hundreds, and knowledge, upon which all intellectual works are
1127
+built, is built up in a similar fashion (Proudhon 1840; Grant 1987;
1128
+Shapiro 1991; Simmons 1992).</p>
1129
+
1130
+<p>
1131
+
1132
+Beyond challenging whether the notion of &ldquo;society&rdquo; employed
1133
+in this view is clear enough to carry the weight that the argument
1134
+demands, critics have questioned the view that societies can be
1135
+<em>owed</em> something or that they can <em>own</em> or
1136
+<em>deserve</em> something (Spooner 1855; Nozick 1974; Moore 2001,
1137
+2010, 2012). Lysander Spooner writes 
1138
+</p>
1139
+
1140
+<blockquote>
1141
+&ldquo;<em>What</em> rights society has, in ideas, which they did not
1142
+produce, and have never purchased, it would probably be very difficult
1143
+to define; and equally difficult to explain <em>how</em> society
1144
+became possessed of those rights. It certainly requires something more
1145
+than assertion, to prove that by simply coming to a knowledge of
1146
+certain ideas&mdash;the products of individual labor&mdash;society
1147
+acquires any valid title to them, or, consequently, any
1148
+<em>rights</em> in them&rdquo; (Spooner 1855).
1149
+</blockquote>
1150
+
1151
+<p>
1152
+Moore charges that defenders of this sort of argument fail to see that
1153
+it may prove too much.</p>
1154
+
1155
+<blockquote>But like the defender of the first cause argument for the
1156
+existence of God who rides the principle of sufficient causation to a
1157
+certain point and then conveniently abandons it (every event or object
1158
+needs a sufficient cause and nothing is self-caused except God) the